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Abstract. Deep neural networks have been shown to be susceptible
to adversarial examples – small, imperceptible changes constructed to
cause mis-classification in otherwise highly accurate image classifiers.
As a practical alternative, recent work proposed so-called adversarial
patches: clearly visible, but adversarially crafted rectangular patches in
images. These patches can easily be printed and applied in the physical
world. While defenses against imperceptible adversarial examples have
been studied extensively, robustness against adversarial patches is poorly
understood. In this work, we first devise a practical approach to obtain
adversarial patches while actively optimizing their location within the
image. Then, we apply adversarial training on these location-optimized
adversarial patches and demonstrate significantly improved robustness
on CIFAR10 and GTSRB. Additionally, in contrast to adversarial train-
ing on imperceptible adversarial examples, our adversarial patch training
does not reduce accuracy.
1 Introduction
While being successfully used for many tasks in computer vision, deep neu-
ral networks are susceptible to so-called adversarial examples [69]: imperceptibly
perturbed images causing mis-classification. Unfortunately, achieving robustness
against such “attacks” has been shown to be difficult. Many proposed “defenses”
have been shown to be ineffective against newly developed attacks, e.g., see
[5,6,17,27,71]. To date, adversarial training [51], i.e., training on adversarial ex-
amples generated on-the-fly, remains one of few approaches not rendered ineffec-
tive through advanced attacks. However, adversarial training regularly leads to
reduced accuracy on clean examples [72,68,82,57]. While this has been addressed
in recently proposed variants of adversarial training, e.g., [67,45,21,3], obtaining
robust and accurate models remains challenging.
Besides imperceptible adversarial examples, recent work explored various at-
tacks introducing clearly visible perturbations in images. Adversarial patches
[14,43,48], for example, introduce round or rectangular patches that can be
“pasted” on top of images, cf. Fig. 1 (left). Similarly, adversarial frames [81]
add an adversarially-crafted framing around images, thereby only manipulat-
ing a small strip of pixels at the borders. While these approaches are limited
in the number of pixels that can be manipulated, other works manipulate the
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Fig. 1: Adversarial patch training. Left: Comparison of imperceptible adversarial
examples (top) and adversarial patches (bottom), showing adversarial example and the
corresponding perturbation. On top, the perturbation is within [−0.03, 0.03] and gray
corresponds to no change. Middle: Adversarial patches with location optimization. We
constrain patches to the outer (white) border of images to ensure label constancy (top
left) and optimize the initial location locally (top right and bottom left). Repeating
our attack with varying initial location reveals adversarial locations of our adversarially
trained model, AT-RandLO in Fig. 4. Right: Clean and robust test error for adversarial
training on location-optimized patches in comparison to normal training and data aug-
mentation with random patches. On both CIFAR10 and GTSRB, adversarial training
improves robustness significantly, cf. Table 3.
whole image, e.g., by manipulating color [39,86] or directly generating images
from scratch [65,13,85,59]. Such attacks can easily be printed and applied in the
physical world [47,33] and are, thus, clearly more practical than imperceptible
adversarial examples. As a result, such attacks pose a much more severe threat
to applications such as autonomous driving [58,33,75] in practice.
While defenses against imperceptible adversarial examples has received con-
siderable attention, robustness against adversarial patches is still poorly under-
stood. Unfortunately, early approaches of localizing and in-painting adversarial
patches [37,56] have been shown to be ineffective [25]. Recently, a certified defense
based on interval bound propagation [35,53] has been proposed [25]. However,
the reported certified robustness is not sufficient for many practical applica-
tions, even for small 2× 2 or 5× 5 patches. The sparse robust Fourier transform
proposed in [8], targeted to both L0-constrained adversarial examples and ad-
versarial patches, reported promising results. However, the obtained robustness
against L0 adversarial examples was questioned in [71]. Overall, obtaining re-
spectable robustness against adversarial patches is still an open problem.
Contributions: In this work, we address the problem of robustness against
large adversarial patches by applying adversarial training on location-optimized
adversarial patches. To this end, we introduce a simple heuristic procedure to
optimize the location of the adversarial patch jointly with its content, cf. Fig. 1
(middle). Then, we conduct extensive experiments applying adversarial training
against adversarial patches with various strategies for location optimization. On
CIFAR10 [44] and GTSRB [66], we demonstrate that adversarial training is able
to improve robustness against adversarial patches significantly while not reduc-
ing clean accuracy, cf. Fig. 1 (right), as often observed for adversarial training on
imperceptible adversarial examples. We compare our adversarial patch training
to [8], which is shown not to be effective against our adversarial patch attack.
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Fig. 2: Our adversarial patch attack on CIFAR10 and GTSRB. Top: correctly
classified examples; bottom: incorrectly classified after adding adversarial patch. Ad-
versarial patches obtained against a normally trained ResNet-20 [38].
2 Related Work
Adversarial Examples: Originally, adversarial examples [69] are meant to
be nearly imperceptible. In practice, Lp norms are used to enforce both visual
similarity and class constancy, i.e., the true class cannot change. A common
choice, p = ∞, results in limited change per feature. Examples include many
popular white-box attacks, such as [34,51,18,29,50,83,24,79] with full access to
the model including its weights and gradients, and black-box attacks, such as
[23,41,10,12,22,36,4,26,15] without access to, e.g., model gradients. In the white-
box setting, first-order gradient-based attacks such as [51,18,29] are the de-facto
standard. Improving robustness against Lp-constrained adversarial examples,
i.e., devising “defenses”, has proved challenging: many defenses are shown to be
ineffective [71,27,5,6,63,20,16,55,31,19,49,17]. Adversarial training, i.e., training
on adversarial examples generated on-the-fly, has been proposed in various vari-
ants [54,40,62,64,46,84,51] and shown to be effective. Recently, the formulation
by Madry et al. [51] has been extended in various ways, tackling the compu-
tational complexity [74,60,76], the induced drop in accuracy [21,73,9,45] or the
generalization to other Lp attacks [70,52,67]. Nevertheless, adversarial robust-
ness remains a challenging task in computer vision. We refer to [80,1,11,78] for
more comprehensive surveys.
Adversarial Patches: In contrast to (nearly) imperceptible adversarial exam-
ples, adversarial deformations/transformations [32,30,2,77,32,42], color change
or image filters [39,86], as well as generative, so-called semantic adversarial ex-
amples [65,13,85,59] introduce clearly visible changes. Similarly, small but visible
adversarial patches [14,48,75,43,58] are becoming increasingly interesting due to
their wide applicability to many tasks and in the physical world [33,47]. For
example, [14,43] use universal adversarial patches applicable to (nearly) all test
images while the patch location is fixed or random. In [14,48,58], they can be
printed and easily embedded in the real world. Unfortunately, defenses against
adversarial patches are poorly studied. In [8], a L0-robust sparse Fourier trans-
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formation is proposed to defend against L0-constrained adversarial examples and
adversarial patches. However, against L0 adversarial examples, the effectiveness
was questioned in [71]. In [25], the interval bound propagation approach of [35,53]
is extended to adversarial patches to obtain certified bounds. However, the cer-
tified robustness obtained in [25] is limited and not sufficient for most practical
applications. Finally, in [37,56], an in-painting approach was used. However, the
effectiveness of such detection and in-painting approaches was already questioned
in the very same work [37]. Here, in contrast to, e.g., [14,43], we consider image-
specific adversarial patches and explicitly optimize their location starting from
a random initialization to increase the effectiveness of the attack. Furthermore,
our adversarial patch training can improve robustness significantly, as demon-
strated against attacks with fixed, random and optimized location with up to
1000 iterations and 30 random restarts. Our experiments, as well as [61], show
that the robustness generalizes to the universal adversarial patches as well.
3 Adversarial Training against Location-Optimized
Adversarial Patches
In the following, we first discuss our adversarial patch attack. Here, in contrast
to related work, e.g., [14,43], we consider image-specific adversarial patches as a
stronger alternative to the more commonly used universal adversarial patches. As
a result, our adversarial patch attack is also untargeted and, thus, suitable for
adversarial training following [51]. Then, we discuss our location optimization
strategies, allowing to explicitly optimize patch location in contrast to consi-
dering random or fixed location only. Finally, we briefly introduce the idea of
adversarial training on location-optimized adversarial patches in order to im-
prove robustness, leading to our proposed adversarial patch training.
3.1 Adversarial Patches
Our adversarial patch attack is inspired by LaVAN [43]. However, following re-
lated work on adversarial training [51], we consider an image-specific, untargeted
adversarial patch attack with an additional location optimization component:
– Image-Specific Adversarial Patches: Content and location of the adver-
sarial patch can be tailored specifically to each individual image. Thus, our
adversarial patch attack can readily be used for adversarial training. As ex-
perimentally shown in [61], training against image-specific attacks will also
improve robustness to universal attacks. Thus, our adversarial patch train-
ing is also applicable against universal adversarial patches as considered in
related work [14,43].
– Untargeted Adversarial Patches: Following common adversarial train-
ing practice, we consider untargeted adversarial patches. This means, we
maximize the cross-entropy loss between the adversarial patch and the true
label, as, e.g., in [51], and do not enforce a specific target label. This is also
different from related work as universal adversarial patches usually target a
pre-determined label.
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Algorithm 1 Our location-optimized adversarial patch attack: Given image
x with label y and trained classifier f(·;w), the algorithm finds an adversarial patch
represented by the additive perturbation δ and the binary mask m such that x˜ =
(1−m) x+m δ that maximizes the cross-entropy loss L(f(x˜;w), y).
Input: image x of class y, trained classifier f , learning rate , number of iterations T ,
location optimization function NextLocation.
Output: adversarial patch given by m(T )  δ(T ).
1: initialize perturbation δ(0) ∈ [0, 1]W×H×C {e.g., uniformly}
2: initialize mask m(0) ∈ {0, 1}W×H×C {square, random or fixed location outside R}
3: for t← 0, . . . , T − 1 do
4: x˜(t) := (1−m(t)) x+m(t)  δ(t) {apply the patch}
5: l := L(f(x˜(t);w), y) {compute loss, i.e., forward pass}
6: ∆(t) := m(t)  sign (∇δl) {compute signed gradient, i.e., backward pass}
7: δ(t+1) := δ(t) +  ·∆(t) {update patch values}
8: δ(t+1) := Clip(δ(t+1), 0, 1) {clip patch to image domain}
9: m(t+1) := NextLocation(f, x, y,m(t), δ(t+1), l) {update patch location}
10: end for
11: returnm(T ), δ(T ) {or return m(t), δ(t) corresponding to highest cross-entropy loss}
– Location-Optimized Adversarial Patches: Prior work consider adver-
sarial patches to be applied randomly in the image [14,43] or consider a fixed
location [43]. In contrast, we follow the idea of finding an optimal patch loca-
tion for each image, i.e., the location where the attack can be most effective.
This has not been considered so far, and will improve the obtained robust-
ness through adversarial training as the attack will focus on “vulnerable”
locations during training.
Notation: We consider a classification task with K classes. Let {(xi, yi)}Ni=1
be a training set of size N where xi ∈ [0, 1]W×H×C and yi ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K −
1} are images and labels with W,H,C denoting width, height and number of
channels, respectively. Let f denote a trained classifier with weights w that
outputs a probability distribution f(x;w) for an input image x. Here, fi(x;w)
denotes the predicted probability of class i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} for image x. The
image is correctly classified when y = argmax i fi(x;w) for the true label y. An
adversarial patch can be represented by a perturbation δ ∈ [0, 1]W×H×C and a
binary mask m ∈ {0, 1}W×H×C representing the location of the patch, which
we assume to be square. Then, an image x after applying the adversarial patch
(δ,m) is given by x˜ = (1 − m)  x + m  δ, where  denotes the element-
wise product. With L(f(x;w), y) we denote the cross-entropy loss between the
prediction f(x;w) and the true label y.
Optimization Problem: For the optimization problem of generating an ad-
versarial patch for an image x of class y, consisting of an additive perturbation
δ and mask m, we follow [51] and intend to maximize the cross-entropy loss L.
Thus, we use projected gradient ascent to solve:
max
δ,m
L (f((1−m) x+m δ;w), y) (1)
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where  denotes the element-wise product and δ is constrained to be in [0, 1]
through clipping, assuming all images lie in [0, 1] as well. The mask m represents
a square patch and is ensured not to occlude essential features of the image by
constraining it to the border of the image. For example, for CIFAR10 [44] and
GTSRB [66], the patch is constrained not to overlap the center region R of size
10× 10 pixels. As discussed below, the position of the patch, i.e., the mask, can
be fixed or random, as in related work, or can be optimized. We also note that
Eq. (1) is untargeted as we only seek to reduce the confidence in the true class
y, and do not attempt to boost the probability of any other specific class.
Attack Algorithm: The attack algorithm is given in Alg. 1. Here, Eq. (1) is
maximized through projected gradient ascent. After randomly initializing δ(0) ∈
[0, 1]H×W×C and initializing the mask m(0), e.g., as fixed or randomly placed
square, T iterations are performed. In each iteration t, the signed gradient is
used to update the perturbation δ(t):
δ(t+1) = δ(t) +  ·∆(t) with ∆(t) = m(t)  sign
(
∇δL(f(x˜(t);w), y)
)
(2)
where  denotes the learning rate, ∇δ the gradient with respect to δ and x˜(t) =
(1−m(t))x+m(t)δ(t) is the adversarial patch of iteration t applied to image
x. Note that the update is only performed on values of δ(t) actually belonging to
the patch as determined by the mask m(t). Afterwards, the Clip function clips
the values in δ(t) to [0, 1] and a location optimization step may takes place, cf.
Line 9. The NextLocation function, described below and in Alg. 2, performs
a single location optimization step and returns the patch at the new location.
3.2 Location Optimization
The location of the patch in the image, given by the mask m, plays a key role in
the effectiveness of the attack. While we ensure that the patch does not occlude
essential features, which we assume to lie within the center R of the image,
finding particularly “vulnerable” locations can improve the attack significantly.
So far, however, related work only considers the following two ways to determine
patch location:
– Fixed Location: The patch is placed at a pre-defined location (e.g., the
top left corner) of the image, outside of the center region.
– Random Location: The patch is placed randomly outside of the center
region. In our case, this means that the patch location may differ from image
to image as we consider image-specific adversarial patches.
Unfortunately, from an adversarial training perspective, both fixed and random
locations are insufficient. Training against adversarial patches with fixed loca-
tion is expected to generalize poorly to adversarial patches at different locations.
Using random locations, in contrast, is expected to improve robustness to adver-
sarial patches at various locations, however, the model is rarely confronted with
particularly adversarial locations. Thus, we further allow the attack to actively
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Algorithm 2 NextLocation function for location optimization: To update the
patch location in Alg. 1, the patch is moved s pixels in each direction within the
candidate setD to check whether cross-entropy loss increases. Then, the movement that
maximizes cross-entropy loss is returned. If the cross-entropy loss cannot be increased,
the location is left unchanged.
Input: image x of class y, trained classifier f , mask m, patch values δ, cross-entropy
loss of current iteration l, stride s, center region R, candidate directions D
Output: new mask position m and correspondingly updated δ
1: function NextLocation(f, x, y,m, δ, l)
2: lmax := l
3: d′ := None
4: {full optimization: D = {up, down, left, right}}
5: {random optimization: one random direction, |D| = 1}
6: for d ∈ D do
7: m′, δ′ ← m, δ shifted in direction d by s pixels
8: x˜ := (1−m′) x+m′  δ′
9: l′ = L(f(x˜;w), y)
10: if l′ > lmax then
11: lmax := l
′
12: d′ := d
13: end if
14: end for
15: if d′ 6= None then
16: m, δ ← m, δ shifted in direction d′ by s pixels if no intersection with R
17: end if
18: return m, δ
19: end function
optimize the patch location and consider a simple heuristic: in each iteration,
the patch is moved by a fixed number of pixels, defined by the stride s, in a set
of candidate directions D ⊆ {up,down, left, right} in order to maximize Eq. (1).
Thus, if the cross-entropy loss L increases in one of these directions, the patch is
moved in the direction of greatest increase by s pixels, and not moved otherwise.
We use two schemes to choose the set of candidate directions D:
– Full Location Optimization: Here, we consider all four directions, i.e.,
D = {up,down, left, right}, allowing the patch to explore all possible direc-
tions. However, this scheme requires a higher computation cost as it involves
performing four extra forward passes on the network to compute the cross-
entropy loss after moving in each direction.
– Random Location Optimization: This uses a direction chosen at random,
i.e. |D| = 1, which has the advantage of being computationally more efficient
since it requires only one extra forward pass. However, it may not be able
to exploit all opportunities to improve the patch location.
The NextLocation function in Alg. 1 is used to update the location in each
iteration t, following the above description and Alg. 2. It expects the stride s,
the center region R to be avoided, and the candidate set of directions D as
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Fig. 3: Robust test error vs. patch
size. Robust test error RErr in % and
(square) patch size using AP-FullLO(50, 3)
against Normal, i.e., adversarial patches
with full location optimation, 50 itera-
tions and 3 random restarts. We use 8×8,
where RErr on CIFAR10 stagnates.
Model CIFAR10 GTSRB
Normal 9.7 2.7
Occlusion 9.1 2.0
AT-Fixed 10.1 2.1
AT-Rand 9.1 2.1
AT-RandLO 8.7 2.4
AT-FullLO 8.8 2.7
Table 1: Clean test error. We report
(clean) test error Err in % for our mod-
els on the full test sets of CIFAR10 and
GTSRB. Our adversarial patch training
does not increase test error compared to
normal training. In contrast, it is actually
beneficial on CIFAR10. This is in stark
contrast to adversarial training on imper-
ceptible adversarial examples [72,68].
parameters. In addition to moving the pixels in the mask m, the pixels in the
perturbation δ need to be moved as well.
3.3 Adversarial Patch Training
We now use the adversarial patch attack to perform adversarial training. The
goal of adversarial training is to obtain a robust model by minimizing the loss
over the model parameters on adversarial patches, which are in turn obtained
by maximizing the loss over the attack parameters. As in [51], this leads to the
following min-max problem:
min
w
E
[
max
m,δ
L(f((1−m) x+m δ;w), y)
]
(3)
where f(·;w) denotes the classifier whose weights w are to be learned. Again,
the perturbation δ and the mask m are constrained as discussed above. As an
adversarially trained model still needs to maintain high accuracy on clean images,
we split each batch into 50% clean images and 50% adversarial patches. This
effectively leads to the following optimization problem:
min
w
{
E
[
max
m,δ
L(f((1−m) x+m δ;w), y)
]
+ E [L(f(x;w), y)]
}
(4)
which balances cross-entropy loss on adversarial patches (left) with cross-entropy
loss on clean images (right). This follows related work [69]. For imperceptible
adversarial examples, 50%/50% adversarial training in Eq. (4) improves clean
accuracy compared to Eq. (3), i.e., training on 100% adversarial examples. How-
ever, it still exhibits reduced accuracy compared to normal training [68,67]. As
we will demonstrate in our experiments, this accuracy-robustness trade-off is not
a problem for our adversarial patch training.
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Varying #iterations T and #restarts r on CIFAR10
Model
T (r=3) r (T=100)
10 25 50 100 500 1000 3 30
Normal 96.9 98.9 99.7 99.8 99.9 100.0 99.8 100.0
Occlusion 54.7 76.1 86.6 93.8 95.1 97.5 93.8 99.4
AT-Fixed 31.2 33.7 35.3 43.3 63.8 73.9 43.3 71.2
AT-Rand 16.4 16.7 16.8 18.1 37.9 57.2 18.1 33.0
Table 2: Ablation study of AP-Rand on CIFAR10. We report robust test error
RErr in % for each model against AP-Rand with varying number of iterations T and
random restarts r. More iterations or random restarts generally lead to higher RErr.
4 Experiments
We evaluate our location-optimized adversarial patch attack and the correspond-
ing adversarial patch training on CIFAR10 [44] and GTSRB [66]. We show that
our adversarial patch attack with location-optimization is significantly more ef-
fective and allows to train robust models while not sacrificing accuracy.
Datasets: We use the 32 × 32 color images from CIFAR10 and the German
Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) datasets. The CIFAR10 dataset
consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 test images across 10 classes. We use
the first 1,000 test images for adversarial evaluation. For GTSRB, we use a
subset with 35,600 training images and 1,273 test images across 43 classes. The
GTSRB dataset consists of signs that are commonly seen when driving, and
hence represents a practical use case for autonomous driving.
Attack: Following the description of our attack in Section 3.1, we consider
adversarial patches of size 8 × 8 (covering 6.25% of the image) constrained to
a border region of 11 pixels along each side, i.e., the center region R of size
10× 10 is not changed to ensure label constancy. For location optimization, we
consider a stride of s = 2 pixels. From all T iterations, we choose the patch
corresponding to the worst (i.e., highest) cross-entropy error. To evaluate our
location optimization strategies, we use four configurations:
– AP-Fixed: Fixed patch location, (3, 3) from top left corner.
– AP-Rand: Random patch location, location not optimized.
– AP-RandLO: Random (initial) location, random location optimization.
– AP-FullLO: Random (initial) location, full location optimization.
We use subscript (T, r) to denote an attack with T iterations and r attempts,
i.e., random restarts. However, if not noted otherwise, as default attacks, we use
T = 100, r = 30 and T = 1000, r = 3.
Adversarial Training: We train ResNet-20 [38] models from scratch using
stochastic gradient descent with initial learning rate η = 0.075, decayed by factor
0.95 each epoch, and weight decay 0.001 for 200 epochs with batch size 100. The
training data is augmented using random cropping, contrast normalization, and
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Results on CIFAR10: RErr in % Results on GTSRB: RErr in %
Model AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO
Normal 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 12.5 95.4 98.3 98.8
Occlusion 94.5 99.7 99.8 99.9 6.7 69.2 79.6 79.9
AT-Fixed 63.4 82.1 85.5 85.1 3.0 85.6 92.3 93.9
AT-Rand 51.0 60.9 61.5 63.3 3.4 11.3 15.6 16.4
AT-RandLO 40.4 54.2 60.6 62.8 3.1 7.6 10.4 10.4
AT-FullLO 27.9 39.6 44.2 45.1 3.3 7.4 10.6 10.6
Table 3: Robust test error RErr on CIFAR10 and GTSRB: We report robust
test error RErr in % for our adversarially trained models in comparison to the baselines.
We tested each model against all four attacks, considering a fixed patch, a random
patch and our strategies of location optimization. In all cases, results correspond to
the per-example worst-case across 33 restarts with T = 100 or T = 1000 iterations. As
can be seen, adversarial training with location-optimized adversarial patches improves
robustness significantly and outperforms all baselines.
flips (flips only on CIFAR10). We train a model each per attack configuration:
(1) AT-Fixed with AP-Fixed(25,1), (2) AT-Rand with AP-Rand(25,1), (3) AT-RandLO
with AP-RandLO(25,1), and (4) AT-FullLO with AP-FullLO(25,1). By default, we use
T = 25 iterations during training. However, as our location optimization based
attacks, AP-RandLO and AP-FullLO, require additional forward passes, we later
also consider experiments with equal computational cost, specifically 50 forward
passes. This results in T = 50 iterations for AT-Fixed and AT-Rand, T = 25 for
AP-RandLO, and T = 10 for AP-FullLO.
Baselines: We compare our adversarially trained models against three base-
lines: (1) Normal, a model trained without adversarial patches; (2) Occlusion, a
model trained with randomly placed, random valued patches; and (3) SFT, the
L0-robust sparse Fourier transform defense from [8]. For the latter, we consider
two configurations, roughly following [8,28]: SFT using hard thresholding with
k = 500, t = 192, T = 10, and SFTP using patch-wise hard thresholding with
k = 50, t = 192, T = 10 on 16× 16 pixel blocks. Here, k denotes the sparsity of
the image/block, t the sparsity of the (adversarial) noise and T the number of
iterations of the hard thresholding algorithm. We refer to [8,28] for details on
these hyper-parameters. Overall, SFT is applied at test time in order to remove
the adversarial effect of the adversarial patch. As the transformation also af-
fects image quality, the models are trained with images after applying the sparse
Fourier transformation, but without adversarial patches.
Metrics: We use (regular) test error (Err), i.e., the fraction of incorrectly clas-
sified test examples, to report the performance on clean examples. For adversar-
ial patches, we use the commonly reported robust test error (RErr) [51] which
computes the fraction of test examples that are either incorrectly classified or
successfully attacked. Following [67], we report robust test error considering the
per-example worst-case across both our default attacks with a combined total of
33 random restarts.
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T=50, r=3 on CIFAR10: Robust Test Error (RErr) in %
Model AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO
Normal 99.0 99.7 99.7 99.6
Occlusion 77.3 86.6 87.4 88.9
AT-Fixed 12.7 35.3 45.5 48.4
AT-Rand 13.2 16.8 26.3 25.7
AT-RandLO 12.7 18.4 24.3 26.0
AT-FullLO 11.1 14.2 22.0 24.4
Table 4: Results for T = 50 iterations and r = 3 restarts on CIFAR10. We
report robust test error in % with limited attack cost, i.e., with T = 50 and r = 3
for each attack. Few iterations and restarts are effective against Normal and Occlusion,
however, RErr for adversarially trained models drops significantly.
4.1 Ablation
Patch Size: Fig. 3 shows the robust test error RErr achieved by the AP-
FullLO(50,3) attack against Normal using various (square) patch sizes. For both
datasets, RErr increases with increasing patch size, which is expected since a
larger patch has more parameters and covers a larger fraction of the image.
However, too large patches might restrict freedom of movement when optimiz-
ing location, explaining the slight drop on GTSRB for patches of size 11×11. In
the following, we use a 8 × 8 patches, which is about where RErr saturates for
CIFAR10. Note that for color images, a 8 × 8 patch has 8 × 8 × 3 parameters.
Fig. 2 shows examples of the 8× 8 pixel adversarial patches obtained using full
location optimization against Normal on CIFAR10 and GTSRB.
Number of Iterations and Attempts: In Table 2, we report robust test error
RErr for various number of iterations T and random restarts r using AP-Rand.
Across all models, RErr increases with increasing T , since it helps generating
a better optimized patch. Also, increasing the number of restarts helps finding
better local optima not reachable from all patch initializations. We use T = 1000
with r = 3 and T = 100 with r = 30 as our default attacks. Finally, considering
that, e.g., AT-Rand, was trained with adversarial patches generated using T = 25,
it shows appreciable robustness against much stronger attacks.
4.2 Results
Adversarial Patch Training with Fixed and Random Patches: The main
results can be found in Table 3, which shows the per-example worst-case robust
test error RErr for each model and attack combination. Here, we focus on adver-
sarial training with fixed and random patch location, i.e., AT-Fixed and AT-Rand,
evaluated against the corresponding attacks, AP-Fixed and AP-Rand, and com-
pare them against the baselines. The high RErr of the attacks against Occlusion
shows that training with patches using random (not adversarial) content is not
effective for improving robustness. Similarly, AT-Fixed performs poorly when at-
tacked with randomly placed patches. However, AP-Rand shows that training
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Norm. Cost on CIFAR10: Robust Test
Error (RErr) in %
Norm. Cost on GTSRB: Robust Test Er-
ror (RErr) in %
Model AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO
AT-Fixed50 45.3 73.4 77.8 76.9 3.3 84.0 91.2 91.6
AT-Rand50 13.2 30.6 35.4 35.7 3.6 12.8 18.7 20.0
AT-RandLO50 40.4 54.2 60.6 62.8 3.1 7.6 10.4 10.4
AT-FullLO50 40.8 50.0 56.9 56.5 4.6 17.7 23.6 23.2
Table 5: Normalized cost results on CIFAR10 and GTSRB. We report robust
test error RErr in % on models trained using attacks with exactly 50 forward passes,
see text for details. As can be seen, training without location optimization might be
beneficial when cost budget is limited.
with randomly placed patches also improves robustness against fixed patches.
On CIFAR10, while using AP-Rand against AT-Rand results in an RErr of 60.9%,
enabling location optimization in the attack increases RErr to 63.3%, indicating
that training with location optimization might further improve robustness. On
GTSRB, AT-Fixed even has higher RErr than Occlusion, which suggests that
patch location might have a stronger impact than patch content on robustness.
Adversarial Patch Training with Location-Optimized Patches: Table 3
also includes results for adversarial trained models with location optimized ad-
versarial patches, i.e., AT-FullLO and AT-RandLO. On CIFAR10, adversarial
training with location-optimized patches has a much stronger impact in improv-
ing robustness as compared to the relatively minor 2.4% increase in RErr when
attacking with AP-FullLO instead of AP-Rand on AT-Rand. Adversarial training
with full location optimization in AT-FullLO leads to a RErr of 45.1% against
AP-FullLO, thereby making it the most robust model and also outperforming
training with random location optimization, AT-RandLO, significantly. On GT-
SRB, in contrast, AT-FullLO does not improve over AT-RandLO. This might be
due to the generally lower RErr values, meaning GTSRB is more difficult to
attack with adversarial patches. Nevertheless, training with random location
optimization clearly outperforms training without, cf. AT-RandLO and AT-Rand,
and leads to a drop of 88.4% in RErr as compared to Normal.
Table 4 additionally shows results for only T = 50 iterations with 3 random
restarts on CIFAR10. Similar observations as above can be made, however, the
RErr values are generally lower. This illustrates that the attacker is required to
invest significant computational resources in order to increase RErr against our
adversarially trained models. This can also be seen in our ablation, cf. Table 2.
Preserved Accuracy: In contrast to adversarial training against impercepti-
ble examples, Table 1 shows that adversarial patch training does not incur a
drop in accuracy, i.e., increased test error Err. In fact, on CIFAR10, training
with adversarial patches might actually have a beneficial effect. We expect that
adversarial patches are sufficiently “far away” from clean examples in the input
space, due to which adversarial patch training does not influence generalization
on clean images. Instead, it might have a regularizing effect on the models.
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Robust test error (RErr) in % on CIFAR10
Model Clean AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO
SFT 12.8 90.5 97.4 96.8 96.7
SFTP 11.1 81.4 89.9 91.1 90.6
Robust test error (RErr) in % on GTSRB
Model Clean AP-Fixed AP-Rand AP-RandLO AP-FullLO
SFT 2.0 18.2 83.4 89.9 90.2
SFTP 2.4 11.8 74.6 80.2 79.6
Table 6: Results for robust sparse Fourier transformation (SFT). Robust test
error RErr in % on CIFAR10 and GTSRB using the robust sparse Fourier transform [8]
defense against our attacks. SFT does not improve robustness against our adversarial
patch attack with location optimization and is, thus, clearly outperformed by our
adversarial patch training.
Cost of Location Optimization: The benefits of location optimization comes
with increased computational cost. Random location optimization and full lo-
cation optimization introduce a factor of 2 and 5 in terms of required forward
passes, respectively. In order to take the increased cost into account, we compare
the robustness of the models after normalizing by the number of forward passes.
Specifically, we consider 50 forward passes for the attack, resulting in: (1) AT-
Fixed50 with AP-Fixed(50,1), (2) AT-Rand50 with AP-Rand(50,1), (3) AT-RandLO50
with AP-RandLO(25,1) and (4) AT-FullLO50 with AP-FullLO(10,1), as also detailed
in our experimental setup. Table 5 shows that for CIFAR10, AT-Rand50 has a
much lower RErr than AT-RandLO50 and AT-FullLO50. This suggests that with
a limited computational budget, training with randomly placed patches without
location optimization could be more effective than actively optimizing location.
We also note that the obtained 35.7% RErr against AP-FullLO is lower than the
45.1% for AT-FullLO reported in Table 3. On GTSRB, in contrast, AT-RandLO50
has a much lower RErr than AT-Rand50 and AT-FullLO50.
Comparison to Related Work: We compare our adversarially trained models
against models using the (patch-wise) robust sparse Fourier transformation, SFT,
of [7]. We note that SFT is applied at test time to remove the adversarial patch.
As SFT also affects image quality, we trained models on images after applying
SFT. However, the models are not trained using adversarial patches. As shown in
Table 6, our attacks are able to achieve high robust test errors RErr on CIFAR10
and GTSRB, indicating that SFT does not improve robustness. Furthermore, it
is clearly outperformed by our adversarial patch training.
Universal Adversarial Patches: In a real-world setting, image-specific at-
tacks might be less practical than universal adversarial patches. However, as
also shown in [61], we found that our adversarial patch training also results in
robust models against universal adversarial patches. To this end, we compute
universal adversarial patches on the last 1000 test images of CIFAR10, with ran-
domly selected initial patch locations that are then fixed across all images. On
CIFAR10, computing universal adversarial patches for target class 0, for exam-
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Normal Occlusion AT-Fixed AT-Rand AT-RandLO AT-FullLO
Fig. 4: Location heatmaps of our adversarial patch attacks. Heat maps cor-
responding to the final patch location using AP-FullLO(10,1000). Top: considering all
r = 1000 restarts; bottom: considering only successful restarts. See text for details.
ple, results in robust test error RErr reducing from 74.8% on Normal to 9.1% on
AT-FullLO.
Visualizing Heatmaps: To further understand the proposed adversarial patch
attack with location optimization, Fig. 4 shows heatmaps of vulnerable loca-
tions. We used our adversarial patch attack with full location optimization and
r = 1000 restarts, AP-FullLO(10,1000). We visualize the frequency of a patch being
at a specific location after T = 10 iterations; darker color means more frequent.
The empty area in the center is the 10 × 10 region R where patches cannot
be placed. The first row shows heatmaps of adversarial patches independent of
whether they successfully flipped the label. The second row only considers those
locations leading to mis-classification. For example, none of the 1000 restarts
were successful against AT-FullLO. While nearly all locations can be adversar-
ial for Normal or Occlusion, our adversarial patch training requires the patch to
move to specific locations, as seen in dark red. Furthermore, many locations ad-
versarial patches converged to do not necessarily cause mis-classification, as seen
in the difference between both rows. Overall, Fig. 4 highlights the importance
of considering patch location for obtaining robust models.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we addressed the problem of robustness against clearly visible, ad-
versarially crafted patches. To this end, we first introduced a simple heuristic for
explicitly optimizing location of adversarial patches to increase the attack’s ef-
fectiveness. Subsequently, we used adversarial training on location-optimized ad-
versarial patches to obtain robust models on CIFAR10 and GTSRB. We showed
that our location optimization scheme generally improves robustness when used
with adversarial training, as well as strengthens the adversarial patch attack.
For example, visualizing patch locations after location optimization showed that
adversarially trained models reduce the area of the image vulnerable to adver-
sarial patches. Besides outperforming existing approaches [8], our adversarial
patch training also preserves accuracy. This is in stark contrast to adversarial
training on imperceptible adversarial examples, that usually cause a significant
drop in accuracy. Finally, we observed that our adversarial patch training also
improves robustness against universal adversarial patches, frequently considered
an important practical use case [14,43].
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